Zoltán Lakatos[1]

The substantialist reason in value research a critical assessment of two Inglehart theses

Summary of Doctoral Thesis

Abstract

Current research into values is dominated by a variable-centered paradigm that defines its inquiry as a study of substances and their impacts on each other. To illustrate the issues with this paradigm, I deconstruct Ronald Inglehart's thesis of postmaterialist value shift and his model of culturally induced economic growth. This critique takes the field analytical perspective, a relational approach to the study of social facts that originates in the pragmatist philosophical tradition and related currents in classical sociology. The engagement with Inglehart's thesis on value change includes a cross-cultural re-analysis of data collected within the scope of the World Values Survey. The study applies the multivariate technique of choice in field analysis, multiple correspondence analysis, which yields more consistent latent constructs than do the linear techniques used as benchmarks—and in Inglehart's studies. Keeping to these dimensions, national values and trajectories of value change challenge Inglehart's account on several counts. The review of Inglehart's proposed update to the endogenous model of economic growth points out inconsistencies with the historical record of public investment in technological innovation and state intervention in general, especially with regard to the economically most developed countries. Incorporating a model using the constructs presented in the first part, this study questions Inglehart's proposition that values have an independent effect on growth. The implications of the two critiques are developed with reference to Weber's concept of elective affinity and Bourdieu's studies of symbolic power. The empirical irrelevance of the culture-economy dichotomy (or symbolic versus material forms of agency) is discussed in connection with the field analytical reformulation of the challenges ahead in the sociology of values.

Key words: value research, substantialism, linear models, structural equivalence, field theory, agency, symbolic power

1 PhD, assistant professor in the Department of Sociology and Communication of at the Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences, Budapest University of Technology and Economics (BME)

Zoltán Lakatos

The substantialist reason in value research
A critical assessment of two Inglehart theses

Summary of Doctoral Thesis[2]

Preliminaries[3]

This study critically deconstructs two theses by political scientist Ronald Inglehart. The first is the postmaterialism thesis, which sketches a rationale for the cultural transformation taking place in advanced industrial societies following World War II. Originally formulated in the 1970s, this theory of economic growth-induced value change had later developed into a detraditionalization, and more recently a civic emancipation thesis. The second is an update to the endogenous model of economic growth with a variable capturing culture. Although the former is more influential, the latter is no less significant because it develops from an attempt at building a bridge between mainstream economics and the social sciences.

This is not a monograph on Inglehart's work. Within its narrower scope, it aims to drill deeper: the purpose is to reexamine the two selected theses, conduct an empirical study by relying on the debates around them, and use the findings to outline the direction that value research should take in order to overcome the limitations identified in connection with the Inglehart school.

Both selected theses reflect the 'mind and mood' of their era. Scholarly engagement with the cultural consequences of the 'thirty glorious' years of the post-World War II economic boom in the West gave rise to various theories announcing the winding down of class-based political conflicts (Inglehart–Rabier 1986, Inglehart 1988, Inglehart–Siemieńska 1988). Inglehart had adopted this view in his postmaterialism thesis: extrapolating Maslow's needs theory (1970) to collective behavior, he had proposed that Western societies had evolved to a stage where, in matters of political conflict, lifestyle, career paths, etc., the impact of what he terms 'economic determinism' is gradually receding (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985a, 1985b; Inglehart–Flanagan 1987; Abramson–Inglehart 1994; Abramson–Ellis–Inglehart 1997; Inglehart–Abramson 1999). From this diagnosis follows his postulate of a cultural shift from 'traditional' to 'postmodern' values. His definition of traditional values includes authoritarianism, religiosity and, most importantly, materialism. Opposed to these are 'postmodern' values: libertarianism, secularism and post- (rather than non-) materialism.

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2 ELTE, Eötvös Loránd University of Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences, Doctoral School, Sociology Program (2014). Supervisor: Róbert Tardos, CSc.

3 Of the two studies presented in this thesis, the chapter engaging with Inglehart's postmaterialism thesis first appeared in Volume 79, Issue S1 of Public Opinion Quarterly (Lakatos 2015) . Copyright for the relevant sections is held by Oxford University Press, reproduced here by permission. A longer version of the section discussing Weber's concept of elective affinity ('Weber versus substantialist reason', referenced here in section 3.3) has been published in Volume 5, Issue 1 of Elpis in Hungarian under the title *Az elektív affinitás: a fogalom hanyagolásának okai és következményei* [Overlooking Elective Affinity: Causes and Consequences] (Lakatos 2011). Copyright for this part is held by the author.

The thesis regards economic growth as *generally* conducive to a de-emphasis of traditional values, albeit with nuances depending on the national context (Inglehart 1990; Inglehart–Abramson 1994; Abramson–Inglehart 1995; Inglehart 1997; Inglehart–Baker 2000; Inglehart–Welzel 2003, 2005).

The thesis of culturally induced economic growth bears the imprint of a current in Western intelligentsia that has become influential with the deregulatory policies starting in the late 1970s. It assumes that the key to modernization lies in rolling back state intervention in the economy—understood as opening up the avenues for 'individual achievement'—, and explains persisting differences in economic development as stemming, at least in part, from cultural differences. Inglehart's contribution follows up on attempts by economists (Arrow 1962; Uzawa 1965; Romer 1986, 1990; North 1990; Grossman–Helpman 1991; Aghion–Howitt 1992; Helliwell 1994; Leblang 1996; Acemoğlu–Johnson–Robinson 2001) to overcome the limitations of the neoclassical growth model (Solow 1956, Swan 1956), in which the production function is dependent on a number of exogenous factors like savings, population growth or technological change. Positing that technological change *originates* in achievement motivation, Inglehart proposes that differences in per capita GDP are partly *rooted* in national differences regarding the emphasis on achievement (Granato–Inglehart–Leblang [GIL] 1996a, 1996b). In addition to endogenous growth theory, the theoretical framework of this line of thought includes the *established* reading of Weber's Protestant ethic thesis (Weber 2005).

Starting from the early 1980s, the postmaterialism thesis and the related empirical apparatus have attracted substantial criticism. Without undue simplification, this boils down to three major issues. The first is that long-term variations and short-term fluctuations of Inglehart's measures are inconsistent with the posited trajectory of value change (Van Deth 1983; Böltken–Jagodzinski 1985; Clarke–Dutt 1991; Duch–Taylor 1993, 1994; De Graaf–Evans 1996; Clarke–Dutt–Rapkin 1997a, 1997b; Davis–Davenport 1999; Davis–Dowley–Silver 1999). The second is Inglehart's definition and measure(s) of (post)materialism, which conflate materialistic concerns with authoritarianism (Marsh 1975; Flanagan 1982a, 1982b; Lafferty–Knutsen 1985; Inglehart–Flanagan 1987; Trump 1991; Haller 2002; Majima–Savage 2007). Later adjustments to Inglehart's definition and refinements of his measures have not done away with conflation: materialism has been subsumed under a broader construct including aspects of authoritarianism; and authoritarianism has been conflated also with religiosity in a measure of 'secular' (as opposed to traditional) values (Inglehart 1997, Inglehart–Baker 2000). Finally, the value indicators have not been tested for configural congruence (or invariance), a prerequisite for cross-cultural comparisons at the individual level (van de Vijver–Poortinga 2002, Moors–Wennekers 2003). In the absence of such tests, national differences and trajectories of change may reflect not actual values but methodological artifacts.

The endogenous growth model updated with a cultural variable raises theoretical and specification issues that are no less significant (Jackman–Miller 1996a, 1996b; Swank 1996). These have been less debated, because Inglehart abandoned this line of research. Nevertheless, as his study remains a reference for attempts at 'operationalizing' culture in macroeconomic models, a close inspection of these issues is required to reveal shortcomings that extend also to the latter.

Perspective and methods

This critique adopts the field analytical perspective, a relational approach to the study of collective behavior that originates in the pragmatist philosophical tradition and related currents in classical sociology. Much of the concerns with Inglehart's theses stem from what field theory identifies as the *substantialist paradigm* (Abbott 1988, 1992a, 1992b; Bourdieu–Wacquant 1992; Emirbayer–Mische 1998; Martin 2003; Savage–Silva 2013). For substantialist reason, the focus of the inquiry is abstract *entities in isolation* and/ or their properties, the variables. This paradigm has long been overcome in the natural sciences: (modern) physics and chemistry in particular owe their existence to a reorientation on *emergent properties* (Cassirer 1953, Hesse 1970). Chemical bonding, living organisms, conscience, and social facts are emergent phenomena, that is, stemming from the *relatedness*—therefore irreducible to the properties—*of the parts* (Dewey 1896, Mead 1934, Lewin 1936, Husserl 1960, Durkheim–Mauss 1963, Emirbayer–Mische 1998, Schröder 1998, Luisi 2002). Substantialist reason is a form of metaphysical thinking in that the objects of its inquiry are defined as existing in their own right, independent of the contexts in which they emerge (Bachelard 2002). This focus gives rise to a series of reifications in the form of false dichotomies: mind versus body, thinking versus acting, substance versus form, etc. The assumption that culture and the economy are objectively existing counterparts is an exercise in reification (Brons 2005), and fits the substantialist template on all counts.

Inglehart's two theses examined in this study reproduce the two main subclasses of substantialist reason: the *self*-action and the *inter*-action paradigms (Dewey–Bentley 1949, Emirbayer 1997). In the former, it is the entities that 'do' things—as suggested by the postulate that cultural substances (achievement motivation, individualistic outlook, etc.) *'bring about'* socioeconomic outcomes. In the inter-action subclass, the focus switches to the properties of the entities, the variables—and the action that the inquiry seeks to isolate takes place *between* the entities. (In other words, it is *triggered* by different levels of entity properties.) The suggestion that driven by a universal utility function, individuals socialized below and above a certain income threshold (scarcity versus affluence) will have different values is closer to this latter subclass—that practitioners of field analysis sometimes call 'the sociology of variables' (Blumer 1956, Esser 1996, Rouanet–Ackermann–Le Roux 2000). The General Linear Model (GLM) adopted by many practitioners of value research reproduces the assumptions of both subclasses (Clogg–Haritou 1997, Manzo 2005, Lebaron 2010).

In statistical formalizations adhering (at least implicitly) to the substantialist perspective, the criteria to retain a model as providing a plausible explanation include the maximization of explained variance and the proscription of collinearity. However, given the relationality of social facts, these criteria are met only under exceptional circumstances. The solutions to this problem: path models, filling in interaction terms, increasingly sophisticated tests for autocorrelation, normally distributed and homoskedastic residuals, etc. do little to resolve the major issues associated with this unrealistic framework (Abbott 1988). Using a parallel from the natural sciences, Lieberson (1985) argues that if physicists had kept to the GLM objective of maximizing explained variance and passing the usual diagnostic tests, they would have never arrived at explaining why things fall. They would have merely provided a set of coefficients expressing the contribution of this or that property (weight, density, composition, etc.) of falling bodies and of the ambient matter to the velocity by which bodies reach the ground. But this is *not* what physicists are *looking for* when they investigate the determinants of motion.

This example points to the crux of the field analytical perspective. Rather than aiming to maximize variance and producing significant predictors in a GLM framework, relational sociology explains individual action with reference to *relative positions* within a field structured along relations of force (Martin 2003). In accordance with the emergence postulate, these relations of force—the properties of the field—are supervenient on individual properties: they constrain action and perception (Sawyer 2001). The research task therefore is to unravel the gravitational principle that structures action in the field. In social fields, this is defined as a prize or a value, an asset, a stake or different types of capital toward which actors are oriented in what John Levi Martin calls 'organized striving' (ibid.). Social fields are fields of struggle—although, in order for the gravitational force specific to a field to exert its effects, it is not a necessary condition that its principle be recognized by the actors engaged in the struggle.

The latter insight constitutes a fundamental contrast with the substantialist—and, by implication, Inglehartian—approach to the study of values. For the latter, individual action is (self-) driven in accordance with the value emphases that develop at the level of consciousness. Different individuals adopt action rationales that range from identical to irreconcilable, but they are all consciously oriented toward the end states that they find desirable. Against this approach, the field analytical perspective stresses that the value emphases that serve as justifications for individual action will often *not explain* actual conduct (V. W. Turner 1974; Bourdieu 1979, 1980a, 1980b). This is because the function of these emphases is to disguise the field's organizing principle. Actors are typically unaware of the objective logic of their actions: instead, what they perceive is their own cognitive simplification, the subjective logic. Put simply: values matter less than what is being cognitively simplified (disguised).

The deconstruction of each Inglehart thesis includes an empirical study organized in accordance with these considerations—although, in order to spell out the underlying theory, we have to first go through a detailed review of the related issues in terms of the method. The concluding chapter relates the findings from the two empirical analyses to Bourdieu's theses on symbolic power, which provide the most coherent formulation of the field analytical perspective as it pertains to value research.

Postmaterialism thesis

Regarding the postmaterialism thesis, this perspective calls for multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), a technique that is still rarely used in sociology despite its empirical potential demonstrated thanks to Bourdieu's work (Bourdieu 1979, Savage–Silva 2013).

To explore the structure of values, Inglehart uses linear multivariate methods such as PCA and factor analysis, where the focus is the variables: on one hand, the input variables, on the other hand, the constructs that the procedure seeks to establish as giving the best description of the original items. In the case of PCA, this is done by computing linear combinations, whereas factor analysis searches for underlying dimensions using regressions. In contrast, multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) focuses on the space of subjects (individuals, collectivities, etc.). This means that unlike linear techniques, MCA does not 'search' for meta-variables that best capture the information contained in the input variables (Benzécri 1992; Blasius–Greenacre 2006; Le Roux–Rouanet 2006, 2010). While a space of latent variables is also constructed in MCA, this is done by calculating *relative distances* in a Euclidean space between subjects based solely on their properties. In MCA, the latent structure emerges *from the data,* rather than being 'imposed' on them. This reflects the field analytical perspective, where the focus is the relations between the parts.

The constructs capturing the latent dimensions that emerge from MCA are subjected to tests of structural equivalence. Construct incongruence indicates significant semantic differences in the content of the dimensions, and therefore precludes cross-cultural comparisons. Given that at the *individual* level, these involve the most stringent equivalence criteria that not even Schwartz's internally most consistent value constructs can satisfy for most countries (Davidov–Schmidt–Schwartz 2008), the country differences are studied with regard to dimensions derived at the *ecological* level. However, even at this level, the number of comparable national entities is significantly reduced—but that is a price to pay if one is to conduct the analysis in accordance with the building blocks of this critique. The country comparisons use Inglehart's analysis as reference and highlight those cases where his instruments mis-measure national differences and trajectories of value change. They also extend to subnational divisions rarely examined in value research.

Updated endogenous growth model

Given the centrality of technological innovation in the endogenous growth model Inglehart has sought to update, the review of culturalist growth theories includes a discussion of the sources of innovation in *basic* technologies. Basic technologies are groundbreaking innovations that constitute paradigm shifts in production (Ruttan 2006, Mazzucato 2013). In accordance with the substantialist paradigm, growth models endogenizing technological change typically gloss over the historical context in which it takes place. As a result, they propose that technological change originates in the self-action of utility-maximizing individuals. In contrast, heterodox accounts of economic growth rely on the economic history of the institutional arrangements under which ground-breaking innovations emerge (Baran–Sweezy 1968, Galbraith 1984, Wade 1990, Evans 1995, Woo-Cumings 1999, Mills 2000, Chang–Evans 2005, Reinert 2007, Chang 2008).

The quantitative analysis includes cross-country regressions of mean rates of per capita GDP growth and absolute per capita GDP levels. As with regard to the space of values, these are specified using Inglehart's empirical models (GIL 1996a, 1996b) as reference. A significant difference is that, in addition to macroeconomic indicators and measures of values, they also include historical factors among the independent variables. Also, as the two value measures in Inglehart's model: the 'Achievement Motivation' and the Postmaterialism scales have been found configurally incongruent, the value scales in my models are the religiosity and authoritarianism constructs identified in the chapter dissecting the postmaterialism thesis. (Authoritarianism is an appropriate independent variable for an endogenous growth model, given the claim that its opposite value, individual autonomy is a prerequisite for innovation, hence economic growth.) Maintaining configural invariance as a criterion, their inclusion reduces the number of countries in the model significantly. To compensate for this reduction, an expanded model uses Schwartz's value scales derived at the ecological level and tested for construct equivalence (Schwartz 1994, 1999, 2006).

Findings and conclusions

Postmaterialism thesis

(1) Instead of stemming from sociologically coherent definitions of religiosity, authoritarianism and materialism, Inglehart's value scales: the Postmaterialism Index, the secular versus traditional, and the self-expression versus survival scales are produced by their conflation, which renders them inadequate to account for such phenomena as non-authoritarian religiosity, secular authoritarianism or even actual materialism.

(2) Multiple correspondence analysis yields conceptually clearer value dimensions than do linear combinations of (PCA) or latent variables imposed on the original items (factor analysis). In the MCA solution, religiosity, authoritarianism and materialism clearly separate out. Comparisons with Schwartz's ecological values confirm their semantic coherence.

(3) In most countries, Inglehart's secular-rational and self-expression-survival measures have not been found structurally equivalent at the individual level. This means that most of the country differences and trajectories in his cultural typology may not represent actual differences in national values.

(4) In contrast, the religiosity and the authoritarianism scales identified with MCA are structurally equivalent at the ecological level in a reasonable number of countries, which allows for cross-cultural comparisons. However, because these measures are Eurocentric, the alternative analysis presented in this study has a narrower coverage than what has become common in the Inglehart school.

(5) The findings obtained with the alternative indicators call into question the core Inglehart thesis of value change induced by economic growth. Rising national affluence does not systematically bring about shifts away from 'traditional sources of authority.' Such a thesis hinges on a restrictive definition of religiosity, in which the coercive elements of institutionalized religion are paramount—not on religiosity proper.

(6) In the societies that constitute the European civilization, religiosity does not 'evolve' in the direction posited by Inglehart, and per capita GDP has a stronger association with authoritarianism than it has with religiosity. Outside transitional Eastern Europe, it is difficult to identify a general movement toward secularization.

(7) What in the Inglehart typology appear to constitute more or less coherent historical clusters are less manifest when making the warranted distinction between religiosity and authoritarianism. For example, most Latin American societies are *not* authoritarian: while still religious, they are about as libertarian as several West-European societies. It is also doubtful whether 'historically Protestant' nations form a coherent cluster. Furthermore, there is no trace of 'American exceptionalism.'

(8) The value change in post-communist societies that Inglehart describes as 'a retrograde movement'—a regression to parochial worldviews (Inglehart–Baker 2000:41)—had not occurred in most of the post-communist nations for which comparable measures exist. What Inglehart measures as an 'increasing emphasis

on traditional values' (ibid.) is, in reality, an increase in religiosity. But most East-European societies had not reverted to more authoritarianism—not even those that have experienced a collapse of their economy or worse, armed conflict.

Updated endogenous growth model

(1) The culturalist reframing of endogenous growth theory does not depart from the standard neoclassical assumptions (Barro–Sala-i-Martin 2004) of utility-maximizing individuals engaged in market competition. While the universalistic definition of 'utility' and 'rationality' does not hold in the case of the updated endogenous growth model incorporating cultural variables, the two approaches are similar in their methodological individualism, whereby both neglect contextual factors. Like other substantialist inquiries, Inglehart's study of the relationship between cultural values and economic growth *'generates a series of false problems about bourgeois entrepreneurship, [...] spontaneous capitalist development and stationary societies'* (B. S. Turner 1978:394). Values enter the endogenous growth model as 'isolated,' that is, without being explained, and are considered as mere emphases impacting the importance of achievement. As a result, the assumption of macro outcomes resulting from simple aggregation of atomized individuals found in neoclassical economics remains unchallenged.

(2) Against these assumptions, the historical processes reviewed in this study indicate that the economy in major industrial powers has been growing at a steady rate despite the absence of private investment in *basic* technological innovation within a market framework responding to existing consumer demand. If by „market framework" is meant a variety of bottom-up processes driven by autonomous consumer demand, then the empirical evidence provides a refutation. Forced labor (List 1885, Wallerstein 1975, Hobsbawm 2001, Polanyi 2001, Adelman 2006, Baptist 2014, Grandin 2014, Horne 2014) and large-scale cultural piracy (Lessig 2004) at the onset of industrialization; R&D dependent on *public funding* (see above)—especially military procurement—, and a patent regime designed to secure monopoly profits earned thanks to taxpayer money at later stages (Gambardella 1995, Angell 2005, Baker 2007); protectionist trade policies and militarism throughout—the sources of economic growth are hardly the kind of innovation effort implied in endogenous growth theory.

The risk taking implicated in the processes conducive to innovation in basic technologies and growth occurs mostly beyond the firm's reach. Left to its own devices, the firm cannot provide the resources required for technological breakthroughs. Rather than standing as empirical evidence of the plausibility of endogenous growth theory, the processes sustaining technological innovation are related to state capitalism, market oligopolies, and rent-seeking. In other words, the 'free market' is neither a necessary condition, nor a major driver of technological innovation and economic growth.

(3) The empirical models of growth and per capita GDP incorporating the religiosity and authoritarianism constructs as well as Schwartz's value scales lend support to the criticism of the proposed update to the endogenous growth model. In models of growth rates, the predictive power of values is progressively reduced to zero when controlling for contextual variables. With per capita GDP as dependent variable, a modest

correlation with authoritarianism/autonomy persists even after controlling for contextual factors. However, this might be an indication of the cultural change triggered by the transformation related to economic growth.

(4) Regressions, like all attempts at formalized explanation in the social sciences yield plausible inferences only when grounded in a solid historical account. The latter provides the context that substantialist reason ignores. Therefore, a specification resulting in a robust coefficient of a cultural variable (ceteris paribus) in a model of economic growth does not, in itself, indicate substantialist inquiry. On the other hand, *an interpretation attributing an autonomous effect to this or that substance* or property does. Given the absence of historical perspective, Inglehart's update to the endogenous model reproduces the latter paradigm.

Symbolic versus material forms of agency—and the field analytical perspective on values

(1) Inglehart has argued that the assumption of reciprocal causality between symbolic and material forms is somewhat paradoxical, yet correct. It follows from the preceding that such suggestions are not paradoxical at all: they stem from the substantialist postulate that self-contained substances exist and moreover constitute the focus of scientific inquiry. If economy and culture are indeed objectively delimited entities, then it is reasonable to suppose that they interact, and that these interactions occur in both directions.

Against this perspective, this study argues that the ordering of cultural ('subjective') and economic ('objective') factors in whatever sequence is empirically meaningless. Cultural and economic aspects of behavior correspond to symbolic and instrumental aspects of agency, which are inextricable. If value research is to overcome some of the major shortcomings reviewed in this study, then it should do away with the reification of abstract theoretical constructs.

(2) Bourdieu's theses on symbolic power provide the clues for a field analytical reformulation of these issues. His work on speech acts, the logic of practice, cultural consumption, and economic reason includes the most consistent sociological application of the pragmatist approach to cognition. His empirical studies demonstrate that 'cultural' is never dissociated from 'structural,' mental representation always stems from agency, and symbolic practices are always, simultaneously instrumental and physical in their origins as well as in their consequences. The materiality of symbolic acts is captured with regard to three main aspects: [a] rituals, [b] bodily hexis, and [c] denial.

[a] As rituals, symbolic practices—from speech acts to judgments of taste—are *performances*: rather than descriptions of reality, they are first and foremost attempts at constituting a state of affairs. Their performative aspect is largely unrecognized (or mis-recognized)—and this unawareness is important in order for the dominants to consolidate their power (Bourdieu 1991). [b] As part of habitus, symbolic acts are intimately tied up in bodily hexis: all manners of mostly unconscious bodily performance expressing one's relation to the world (Bourdieu 1990, 1998). [c] Finally, symbolic acts express the distance actors take from the 'physicality' of existence—a relationship that ranges from open embrace to denial (Bourdieu 1984). Higher positions in the social hierarchy correspond to increased investment in denial: euphemisms, the sophistication of forms serve the purpose of distancing oneself from the 'baseness' of the matter, transcending the temporality of existence.

(3) In sum, symbolic practices merely reflect the properties of the field relative to the specific position

occupied by the actor: mental structures and field structure are isomorphic. Accordingly, rather than conceiving of symbols, vocabularies, motives as 'external manifestations of subjective and deeper lying elements in individuals,' the field analytical perspective relates them to *'delimited social situations for which they are the appropriate vocabularies'* (Mills 1940: 913).

(4) The misreading of Weber's Protestant ethic (PE) thesis is a significant factor in the failure to recognize the embeddedness of mental representations: 'culture,' 'ideas,' 'values,' etc. in the context of agency. The substantialist perspective, which in value research has developed into a dominant practice—Inglehart's studies being a case in point—has adopted what Weber would (and, in fact, did) call a 'doctrinaire' derivative of his thesis (Weber 2005:49). The PE thesis not only did not hold an idealist view of the processes leading to modern capitalism, but defined itself *against* such an approach. What Weber set out to explain was not how whatever spirit 'gave rise' to a new economic order, but rather how specific mental dispositions formed in a given socioeconomic context turned out to be *adequate* for already existing forms of capitalist enterprise (Howe 1978, Parkin 1983, Thomas 1985, Löwy 2004, Chalcraft 2005, de Paula 2005, Runciman 2005, Treviño 2005, Carrier 2010, McKinnon 2010, Lakatos 2011). However, Weber's main argument concerning the *elective affinity* (correspondence) between symbolic and material forms of agency has been mostly disregarded because it was formulated in no less than six articles (Weber 1904, 1905, 1907, 1908, 1910a, 1910b)—only two of which are included in what posterity has come to know as Weber's Protestant Ethic, 'the book.' To sum up, Weber's PE argument is close to Bourdieu's concept of field and habitus. It can not only be 'accommodated with,' but is a sociological formulation of the emergence postulate, according to which the materiality and symbolism of agency are intertwined (Bourdieu 1990).

(5) The field theoretical perspective on values helps reformulate the problems related to structural equivalence. Since the cultural emphases that latent constructs purport to capture are relational, the researcher has to fine-tune the method of inquiry in order to account for this flexibility. Field theory suggests that even constructs whose structural invariance has been established—including the measures of religiosity and authoritarianism proposed in this study—may be of limited empirical relevance. This is because while it can be demonstrated that what they do capture has reasonably invariant meaning across the subsets (nations) studied, this invariant structure might still not account fully for the underlying phenomenon.

My indicator of authoritarianism seems to fit a traditional formulation (rejection of outgroups, oppressive gender roles, restraints on the freedom of speech, resentment of political subversion)—, but this does not mean that those who, by these standards, qualify as libertarian are indeed non-authoritarian in contexts where authoritarianism has other carriers. Bourdieu finds survey evidence that elites gradually shift to liberal or libertarian positions in matters of domestic morality that are becoming secondary or insignificant to the exercise of their power, because the levers of social control have also shifted—that is, from more 'tangible' to less visible means of coercion. However, they will retain the authoritarian outlook in matters perceived as central to the social order and will remain intolerant of what they see as challenges to their domination (1984: 432).

The same caution is in order regarding the definition of materialism. Sociologists and heterodox economists have argued that the imperative of material accumulation has always included an expressive function (Baran–Sweezy 1968, Galbraith 1984, Polanyi 2001, Veblen 2007). Therefore, far from subsiding among the affluent sectors (or in an overall affluent society), materialism merely manifests itself in different, more sophisticated forms—to the point of being unrecognizable thanks to the energies invested in wasteful consumption and sophisticated rituals. Higher positions in the social hierarchy correspond to increased investment in wasteful consumption, and apparently futile, disinterested activities, whose function is to deny one's own and repudiate others' materialism. But this does not mean that the affluent sectors are less materialistic: subject to the actors' relative positions in the field, material interest is expressed in many different forms.

(6) Finally, and most importantly, *a sociology of values adopting the field theory perspective has to caution against attributing too much theoretical importance to values.* The more carefully the researcher goes about detecting the structure of those representations that (a) fit Schwartz's practical definition of values *('normative emphases that underlie and justify the functioning of social institutions'*) (Schwartz 2011: 314) and (b) capture all significant aspects of the specific values considered, the closer the resulting construct(s) will be not to 'the value(s)' but to the gravitational principle around which the field (including the values) is organized. This is because *'the subjective experience of values as injunctions is a cognitive simplification of what is otherwise a complex task of navigating a field'* (Martin 2003: 37, emphasis added). This reflects what Bourdieu proposes in Distinction with regard to symbolic practices: although the judgments of taste specific to different locations in the field appear incommensurable from the standpoint of the actors, they are commensurable from the analytical perspective, because they can be brought to a common benchmark by revealing the forces structuring the field. In other words: *the more latent the construct, the less it taps into the cognitive simplification (stemming from subjective experience), and the more it reveals what is being cognitively simplified—that is, the gravitational principle.* Regarding the outcomes, it is the logic of the field that matters, not the cognitive simplification.

(7) A field analysis of religiosity, authoritarianism and materialism at the level of individual behavior will relate these values to the organizing principles of the field of class relations—the broadest field structuring agency, and the subfields defined with reference to the possession of specific assets/capitals. Bourdieu's empirical accounts of symbolic power show that in addition to the amount of (economic) capital possessed, the symbolic relation to material interest—ranging from embracing to denial—are keys to this principle. Likewise, if values as cognitive simplifications are indeed secondary to the 'task of navigating the field,' then it is legitimate to suppose that religiosity, authoritarianism and materialism—and, moreover, all 'normative emphases'—can be related to the same underlying principle. After all, with reference to the epistemological tradition in which field analysis is embedded, it can be argued that *these three values all express the distance actors take from the open expression of material interest.* Materialism is the most straightforward manifestation of this opposition. In the case of religiosity, the ultimate value (the sacred, in the Durkheimian [2001] sense) is defined in opposition to worldly, that is, material concerns. Authoritarianism and its opposite value, libertarianism, relate, in the final analysis, to approval or rejection of coercion—regardless of 'format' or 'medium' but always with reference to legitimizing (un)equal access to assets. *If this perspective is correct, then the research task will be to identify the appropriate level of analysis where these euphemizations are sufficiently disparate to conceal—from the*

standpoint of the individual actor—the gravitational principle, but at the same time transsituational enough to form stable orientations.

(8) In order to reorient its inquiry on the actor-field dialectic, value research needs to abandon the variable-centered approach—including the culture-economy dichotomy—as empirically irrelevant. In the era of Big Data, this will be difficult because the substantialist temptation is almost insurmountable (Wacquant 1992: 15): there is no shortage of indicators for any research idea, no matter how well formulated. The issues with Inglehart's two theses reviewed in this thesis point to the limitations of this paradigm.

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